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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission:
A Deadly Dose of Double Deference
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

T

Supreme Court decision in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 1
marks yet another backward step in the march
of constitutional law. As everyone already
knows, the bottom line in McConnell was that
Congress has a free hand to regulate what it
perceives to be the pernicious influence of
money on electoral politics. The control of corruption and the appearance of corruption in federal elections are both valid governmental interests. Armed with that vast insight, the five
member majority upheld the two key provisions of the Bipartisan—read: Incumbent Protection—Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) that
places limitations on the amount of soft-money
contributions2 to political parties and that limits the amount of advertising that may be done
by and on behalf of political parties within 30
or 60 days of an election. 3 The BCRA contains
some mind-numbing detail that promises to
provide full employment to the next generation
of election lawyers. But it takes far less ingenuity to see why this new and powerful system of direct regulation on speech deserved
an instant and merciless repudiation by the
Supreme Court. Elections count as among the
most important and distinctive activities of any
HE
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democratic society. The dense network of regulations under the BCRA imposes a manifest
limitation on the ability of individuals to speak
for themselves or to contribute to the war chests
of others who are prepared to speak on their
behalf. The upshot is less political speech.
The key question in these cases is what justification Congress can offer on behalf of this
massive regulatory system. The success or failure of that justificatory exercise depends critically on the level of scrutiny that the Court
brings to the central provisions of the BCRA.
Before McConnell, it appeared—past tense—as
though constitutional scrutiny, like Gaul, was
divided into three parts. The highest standard
of strict scrutiny was routinely applied to political speech necessary for the preservation of
democratic institutions. The “compelling state
interest” test demanded the identification of an
imperative social end coupled with the selection of means tightly calculated to achieve that
end. Overregulation was a fatal constitutional
infirmity. Next in the pecking order was intermediate scrutiny, which called, roughly speak-

1

124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1976, contributions to parties were limited only if used for specific
endorsements of particular candidates. Funds received
within these limits are hard money. Under the BCRA, all
contributions to national parties must be hard money,
whatever they are to be used for, and the application of
the federal restrictions to state and local parties is greatly
expanded.
3 Section 323(b).
2
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ing, for a solid connection between important
social ends selected and the means chosen to
achieve them. Hence, this test leaves somewhat
more “give” on both the ends and means dimensions of scrutiny. Last, and lamest, in the
constitutional firmament was the (mis)named
rational basis test, which routinely sustains
economic regulation for which the state can
supply a convenient fig leaf of respectability.
Wrong arguments made with a straight face
were sufficient to carry the day. Under traditional constitutional theory, strict in theory
spelled fatal in fact; rational basis was the
open sesame to constitutional vindication; and
intermediate scrutiny created the occasional
horse race. Huge portions of the constitutional
struggle lay in the selection of the standard, not
in the fine points of interpretation for any particular statute or clause.
The central challenge of mainstream constitutional theory was, and is, to explain why different levels of scrutiny were, and are, brought
to different constitutional challenges. The constitutional text provides no clue to this enterprise. The commerce clause and the takings
clause are not written in invisible ink. Similarly,
the first amendment, at least as to political
speech, and the equal protection clause, at least
as to race, are not written in indelible ink. And
whatever the comparative durability of different provisions, why bring different levels of
scrutiny to different challenges made under the
same constitutional provision? The single most
important litmus test is, without question, the
confidence that the Court shows toward the
political processes of Congress and the states.
When it thinks that all factions and interest
groups are able to fend for themselves, the
Court blesses the political process, and happily
defers to legislative choices, piously noting the
institutional limitations that preclude its second guessing the political branches of government. But when the Court perceives a flawed
political process, in that it excludes or marginalizes certain groups, it will spring to action to
nullify the imbalance. No one who has so much
as glanced at the history of race relations in the
United States prior to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 can deny the obvious appeal of linking
rotten politics to heightened levels of constitutional review.

EPSTEIN

This simple insight, grossly misapplied,
shores up the defense of the BRCA offered
in self-conscious joint authorship between Justices Stevens and O’Connor, both of whom
were, once, Republican appointments to the
bench. Their decision starts out with a long
lament of the corrupt influence money has on
politics. Their joint decision treats the “sober
minded” Elihu Root as the hero du jour for his
progressive call to keep politics out of public
life. They fear that the public will become
quickly disillusioned with politics so long as
powerful corporations, unions and individuals
can use dollars to gain access to legislators.
Congress (whose expertise in this area comes
from constant practice) is regarded as capable
of healing itself. To Justices Stevens and
O’Connor, the BCRA does not simply edge
over some imaginary constitutional bar. No,
they believe it will stem the tide of influence
that dominates the American political scheme,
by plugging the loopholes under the original
FECA.
There is something deeply troublesome
about this whole scenario, which prompts the
title to this short paper. The striking feature of
the decision in McConnell is the thinness of its
account of political life. The decision is content
simply to announce that the record is “replete”
with instances in which money has purchased
access to the political scene. Justices Stevens
and O’Connor treat the common practice of
giving to both political parties as evidence of
the sad truth that the donors care solely about
access to key legislators and are indifferent to
any larger ideological commitments of the candidates and public officials to whom they contribute their funds.4 Missing from this account
is any explanation as to why the rich and famous clamor for access to politicians in the first
place. The simplest explanation for this lies in
two simple facts. First, politicians have a good
number of resources that they can sell to the
highest bidder. Second, politicians have the
means to extort resources from the individuals
by threatening them with adverse legislation.
The initial question, which is nowhere addressed in the Stevens/O’Connor opinion, is

4

124 S. Ct. at 649.
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how it is that politicians obtain the power to do
the bidding of special interests (against whom
we should all rightly rail) in the first place.
The answer to this question lies in the problem of double deference. The initial round of
deference is not connected with the short term
activities within the political process, but rather
with the larger question of what it is that legislators (aka politicians) should do in the first
place. The second round of deference arises
in part because of the Supreme Court itself,
which, in its relaxation of the protection of
property rights and economic liberties, has created an unnecessary increase in the opportunities for politicians to trade on their office. The
first-best solution in these instances is not to
regulate the flow of campaign funds directly,
but to defuse the entire process by removing
the possibility of extensive forms of property
and economic regulation from the legislative
plate in the first instance. Much of the source
of difficulty in this area stems from such decisions as Euclid v. Ambler Power,5 insofar as it
deals with zoning, and Nebbia v. New York,6 insofar as it deals with price controls. We are
likely to do far better as a nation by rejoicing
in the present toothless nature of campaign finance regulation on the one hand and by cutting out large chunks of the state power to regulate economic and social affairs on the other.
Strong constitutional safeguards on both levels
are better than the current situation which recognizes congressional (and state) dominance in
both areas. If Congress has less to sell, the usual
suitors will pay far less for access to its chambers. Let me first examine the irreducible element of politics in public life and then turn to
the interconnection between state regulation of
the economy and campaign finance reform.

ON THE NECESSITY OF
POLITICAL INTRIGUE
Any analysis of campaign finance must begin with the sober recognition that no matter
how political institutions are organized, interest groups will seek out elective officeholders
with political power. Society turns to government to provide a set of collective goods that
no set of voluntary transactions can provide.

As the general economic theory of public goods
indicates, peace, good order, and social infrastructure cannot be efficiently supplied by voluntary markets because the ostensible benefits
that they create must be given to all so long as
they are given to one. Since they are nonexcludable, everyone has an incentive to freeload
on the actions of others.7
Ordinary politics would be relatively tame
if these so-called public goods were really
“goods,” by which I mean all individuals enjoyed the goods and all detested the public
bads. If the only differences among individuals were on the intensity of their preferences,
the task of governance would be to match benefits and costs, such that, ideally, each individual would receive a value from the public good
greater than the taxes and other resources that
he was required to contribute to it. With this
happy scenario no public bads would ever be
created: so long as all individuals attach the
same “sign” to any given public expenditure,
no one will lobby to spend resources for public “goods” shunned by all. The freeriding that
remains should be capable of resolution in any
society in which all individuals share a single
fundamental conception of good and bad.
Unfortunately politics is difficult because
public goods in the economic sense are not
public goods in that decisions favored by some
are opposed by others. Should the United
States decide to intervene in some foreign conflict on the side of A or B? Should it build this
or that dam? Should it put the street lamp on
a corner where the light is welcomed by some
citizens but proves an annoyance to others?
Each of these quintessential public decisions,
large and small, will please some individuals,
aggrieve others, and leave some in between.
The only open question is which individuals
will fall into which class.
This skewed distribution of payoffs works itself back into the incentive structure of the
various interest groups. If outcome A is worth
11000 to one group and outcome B is worth
21000, then group A members have a built in

5

272 U.S. 365 (1926).
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
7 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965).
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reason to spend private resources to push the
public decision in their direction. Their opponents have the same motivations but opposite
interests. This process can consume enough resources to make all outcomes inferior to doing
nothing at all. Yet by the same token, there is
a crude and approximate sense in which God
favors the larger battalions, so that the groups
that can amass larger resources may be more
likely to advance some net social goods, assuming some single metric captures the gains
and losses of all individuals.
One obvious way to influence outcomes is to
change the mix of the political figures who
make the critical choices. Greater resources are
devoted to public elections as the overall stakes
increase. There are, however, difficulties in executing this program because the election of a
candidate does more than influence any single
decision. Public officials vote on countless issues. It is therefore risky business to invest too
many resources in a candidate who may support you on one issue but oppose you on the
next. Those expenditures are of uncertain value
because of the difficulty of figuring out which
other interest groups will invest, positively or
negatively, in a candidate whose election members of a single group either support or oppose.
There is little doubt that, even in the absence
of regulation, political actors who care deeply
about single issues will choose to put more of
their resources in groups that lobby the issue,
rather than in electing candidates whom they
hope will be more sympathetic to their cause.
Viewed in this light, it makes perfect sense for
corporations, unions and prominent individuals to secure access to key officials, precisely because they do not know the issues that will
matter come the next term, but do want an audience to whom they can make their case,
whatever the issue turns out to be.
At this point, we can be confident that the
Supreme Court is correct insofar as it suggests
that purchased access to key candidates will
work itself through to “change legislative outcomes.”8 Big deal. Some showing that the legislative outcomes under the current porous
regime are worse than those under this new
regime is needed to bridge the gap. Here not a
single word written by Justices Stevens or
O’Connor tends to support that stronger result,
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and for good reason. First, they have no descriptive account as to how the influence works
in any particular case. Nor is it easy to supply
a description. Soft money contributions are
only a fraction of the total revenues that are
spent on political campaigns. The money spent
by one group may well neutralize that spent by
another. All soft money may well be dwarfed
by the expenditures that independent pundits
make about elections, including those who rail
against the evils of soft money. The money that
is spent could have beneficial consequences, by
reducing the costs of investigation to Congress
about the consequences of various forms of legislation. The huge consequences of political decisions don’t disappear because of a soft money
or issue ad ban. Resources will surely be redirected to other activities that could be better or
worse than the ones that they displace. Yet the
changes in strategies in response to the legislative behaviors are nowhere taken into account.
Second, Justices Stevens and O’Connor have
no normative view whatsoever as to what
counts as good or bad legislation. In dealing
with the classical public choices, that view is
the only proper approach to such things as
what kind of war should (or should not) be
waged in Iraq, and whether Taiwan should be
treated as an independent sovereign. Unfortunately, however, we do know one point about
the current situation which does point to a systematic bias. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his
dissent, each and every prohibition found in
the BCRA—surprise!—tends to favor incumbents who already enjoy the benefits of office
over the outsiders who do not.9 The case is one
in which the formal equivalence of regulation
on insiders and outsiders is matched by a disparate impact. It takes no public choice genius
to realize that all incumbents share a common
desire to resist involuntary turnover in public
office. Yet there is no explanation by the Court
as to how the entrenchment of incumbents offers even the slightest assistance to democratic
theory. As that is the case, then the usual rule
on strict scrutiny as it applies to political speech
should not be displaced by some ad hoc

8
9

124 S. Ct. at 664.
Id. at 720–21.

235

MCCONNELL V. FEC

(intermediate?) standard of “closely drawn”
scrutiny, whose sole function is to stifle facial
challenges while holding out some nebulous
promise to consider some as-applied challenge
long after the basic system has taken hold. I
conclude, therefore, that for decisions that do
belong in the public space, the deference afforded by the Court counts as a major compromise of the traditional guarantees of freedom of speech. The reduction of available
information from all sources, the high cost of
administrative regulation and the skew that it
places on political discourse should have sent
the BCRA to an early and ignominious death.
How ironic it is that the Supreme Court is prepared to defer to Congress on the regulation of
free speech after its own expose’ of the sorry
system of electoral politics that selected its
members!

THE SECOND FORM OF DEFERENCE
The sins of this new found judicial deference
on matters of speech have been, to say the least,
mightily compounded by a second, regrettable,
form of deference that has long been a fixture
in American constitutional law. Much of the
lobbying in Congress does not take place with
respect to the indisputable public functions of
government. Rather, it is directed to the regulation of economic affairs broadly construed
within the economy. Here of course its sorry
description of congressional politics should
have led the Supreme Court to look with suspicion on the endless scads of special interest
legislation that pour forth from Congress and
the states. But the usual bromides of congressional expertise and judicial incompetence
have led to a wholesale judicial capitulation of
oversight over regulation. The simplest way
to make the basic point is to examine Justice
Stevens’s and O’Connor’s example of the clever
ruse that the milk industry used to amass hefty
sums to aid Richard Nixon’s reelection campaign in order to promote its case for minimum
price supports.10 An organized raft of small
contributions allowed the industry to evade the
spending and disclosure limitations in the then
applicable campaign regulation. Well they
should, in light of the hefty difference between

the competitive and monopoly (controlled)
price.
On this issue, however, as opposed to the
grand affairs of state, it is possible to issue
a categorical denunciation of the legislation
passed at the behest of the dairy industry. The
monopoly situation reduces output, raises
prices, undercuts consumer surplus and blocks
new entry, all of which are cardinal economic
sins. It is for that reason that the system of minimum price supports arguably would not have
withstood scrutiny under the early doctrines
that allowed Congress and the states to regulate prices only in those industries “affected
with the public interest.” 11 In its best meaning,
the term meant that the state could regulate the
maximum rates of a monopoly industry but
could not prop up the minimum rates of a competitive industry. The former task is hard to
discharge, and may well be counterproductive.
But at least the ends are intelligible even if the
means are uncertain. The latter task is costly
and socially destructive, but in Nebbia v. New
York,12 an otiose Supreme Court brushed aside
all qualms about rate regulation and blessed
New York’s effort to prop up its dairy cartel.
This fundamental structural decision to allow Congress and the states to flip freely between competition and monopoly changes the
political landscape by allowing the maneuvers
that Justices O’Connor and Stevens denounce.
Once this new power is conferred upon the legislature, farmers on the one side and consumer
groups on the other will descend on Washington and state capitals in order to state their case.
There is now some new bauble that Congress
can sell, and some cushy preference that Congress can threaten to remove, so that the level
of political discretion translates into a greater
opportunity for abuse and intrigue. Justice
Stevens (who today never supports the constitutional protection of property rights) and
Justice O’Connor (who sometimes does) could
have done a far greater service to the cause of

10

124 S. Ct. at 646–47 n. 6.
The history is complex. For my account of the ambiguities, see Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick
to His Last: A Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine S. 138, S141–142 (2003).
12 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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campaign reform by taking this issue off the
table by resurrecting the long-lost constitutional protection of economic liberties. They
could have done the same thing for property
rights. Thus, last term both voted in support of
the Copyright Term Extension Act in Eldred v.
United States,13 on the familiar ground that only
Congress had the expertise to decide whether
to extend copyrights for 20 years at the behest
of the Disney Corporation and the Gershwin
Estate in celebration of the late Sonny Bono, no
less. Let the Court take a strong constitutional
position against the giveaway of various public domain rights, and yet another congressional window is no longer open for business.
Do the same with respect to the labor statutes,
the antidiscrimination laws in employment,
and across the board Congress will have fewer
goodies to dispose of, and in consequence there
will be less to fear and less to hope for from its
operation. This system of regulation is far more
effective than BCRA’s controls of election finances, for once the doctrine of deference is out
across the board, then all forms of influence are
worth less. The BCRA treats only symptoms
but ignores the underlying disease. It promises

EPSTEIN

to shift the sources of political influence, but
will do little to improve the overall situation.
Severely circumscribing legislative power does
more to lessen all types of political currency. It
is no panacea because influence will remain
a political given for those inevitably, indeed
properly, public decisions that remain. But by
narrowing the class of public issues, it becomes
possible to return a greater measure of social
control to ordinary people by limiting the
power of Congress to meddle in the lives of its
citizens. Now that’s a campaign reform worth
fighting for!
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